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STRATEGIES FOR AN EMPLOYEE ROLE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Brett H. McDonnell*
INTRODUCTION
One way to make U.S. corporations more sustainable is to
broaden the group of stakeholders whose interests are considered in
making decisions. One of the most important groups of stakeholders
is corporate employees, both because their own stake is critical to
their well-being and because employees may value the interests of
other stakeholders more than corporate shareholders or managers
do. Yet, corporate law does nothing to encourage any role for
employees in corporate governance.' Corporate law focuses on just
three groups within the corporation: shareholders, directors, and
officers. This Article evaluates a number of possible strategies for
creating a role for employees in corporate governance. The
strategies include:
Using areas other than business association law to enhance
the legal rights of individual employees;
Encouraging officer or director power, hoping that officers and
directors will side with employees and other interests more
than shareholders;
Encouraging shareholder power, hoping that employees agree
with shareholders on the need to keep managers accountable;
Supporting unions as a source of countervailing power;
Promoting means for directly giving employees a collective
voice within corporations, e.g. through employee
* Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank participants at
the Wake Forest Law Review's Symposium, "The Sustainable Corporation," for
useful comments.
1. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Corporate Governance and the Role of the
Employee, PARTNERSHIP AT WORK: THE CHALLENGE OF EMPLOYEE DEMOCRACY:
LABOR LAw ESSAYS 110 (2003), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=885969.
429
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
representation on the board, employee councils, nonbinding
employee votes on particular matters, employee surveys, or
similar means;
Promoting noncorporate legal forms of business association in
which employees can play a greater role; or
Promoting changes in corporate culture and norms that
empower employees.
This Article suggests criteria for evaluating these strategies.
One must balance the probability of success of a strategy with the
net benefits it would achieve if successful. The benefits and costs of
each strategy must include effects on the internal efficiency of
corporations, on employee well-being, on the environment, and on
the broader community. One must also balance short-term and
long-term effects of the differing strategies. This Article applies
these criteria to the seven listed strategies, and suggests a mix of
strategies that appears most attractive at this point. No strategy
has much chance of improving sustainability in the short run. But,
in the long run, the last three strategies above-experimenting
within states and corporations with various ways of giving
employees voice within corporations and other legal forms-look
most promising (or more accurately, least unpromising).
The Article is organized as follows: Part I considers the
relationship between employees and sustainability; Part II lays out
the competing strategies; Part III describes criteria for choosing
among the strategies; and Part IV applies the criteria to the
strategies to suggest the mix that appears most attractive.
I. EMPLOYEES AND SUSTAINABILITY
Why look to corporate governance as a way to promote
sustainability? Why not instead focus on legal changes that force or
encourage companies to behave more sustainably?2 Such external
approaches have serious limits. 3 First, it would be quite difficult,
and highly intrusive, to write laws that adequately constrain or
price all external effects of corporate actions.4 Second, even if the
laws were fully adequate in principle, they are likely to be under-
enforced; therefore, enforcement depends on corporate actors to
voluntarily comply. 5 Third, corporations built to ruthlessly pursue
2. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33.
3. See Beate Sjafjella, Internalizing Externalities in E.U. Law: Why
Neither Corporate Governance Nor Corporate Social Responsibility Provides the
Answers, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 977, 981 (2009).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 993.
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profit are likely to capture the political system and prevent many
needed laws from ever being passed.6 Thus, an external legal
strategy needs to be supplemented by efforts to make corporations
internally consider their effects on the environment and society.
Yet, any approach that looks to changes in corporate governance
as a strategy for promoting sustainability faces serious objections
from the conventional economic picture of the firm. Markets should
push firms to efficiently use available resources, and corporate
governance itself should be adapted to minimize transaction costs. 7
How can changes in governance improve the markets? Part of the
answer is that if, as just suggested, the law has not forced prices to
internalize all relevant externalities, then we may want corporate
decisionmakers to voluntarily choose to internalize those
externalities. But doing so, by definition, requires accepting a lower
financial surplus than would otherwise be available. Is it plausible
that changes in governance can induce companies to do that?
I see two broad ways in which stakeholder theories of corporate
governance hope to address this challenge. First, they hope that
giving more power to parties with environmentally friendly
preferences will induce companies to be more "green." But there are
two major limits to that answer. One must explain why
shareholder-focused companies will not take on such green-friendly
actions themselves, if such actions will induce stakeholders to
associate with the company more cheaply. The answer to this is
that, presumably, companies that give some real power to other
stakeholders are able to more credibly commit to promoting their
interests, and hence can better earn their commitment and loyalty.
The other, more severe limit, is that it would appear that most
members of the major stakeholder groups, at least in the current
state of human culture, are only willing to go a modest distance in
accepting lowered economic returns in a trade-off for better
environmental performance.8
A more promising reason arises for believing corporate
governance can help if one believes that many, indeed most, current
companies have large amounts of waste in their performance-as
suggested by X-efficiency theory.9 If this is so (as I suspect it is,
6. See id.
7. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN.
305 (1976), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=94043.
8. See Alissa Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility:
Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary
Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 297-99
(2009).
9. See generally Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency us. X-Efficiency'
56 AM. EcoN. REV. 392 (1966) (explaining the theory of "X-Efficiency"); ROBERT
S. FRANTZ, X-EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1990).
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although that is a major debate), then there may well be room for
improving the environmental impact of companies without lowering
the stakeholder's economic returns. For addressing global warming,
more efficient energy use by companies is a very promising area.10
Even if one believes this possibility exists, one must still explain
why involving stakeholders in governance may help improve X-
efficiency. I suggest here why that may be so in the case of
employees.
The relationship between employees and sustainability depends
in part on the notoriously slippery concept of "sustainability."11 A
key focus is clearly on the environment, but many definitions also
consider goals such as meeting present needs12 or achieving a
satisfactory moral and spiritual existence.13 One popular concept in
business social responsibility is the "Triple Bottom Line," the idea
that businesses should measure their performance in terms of
conventional profits and the impact on people and the
environment. 14 We should thus consider both the direct effect of the
involvement in decision making on employees themselves, and the
indirect effect of such involvement on both economic productivity
and the environment. I consider these effects quite briefly, in part
because I have already explored them in an earlier paper. 15
The first bottom line is conventional profits.16  Employee
involvement may increase productivity and hence create stronger
economic growth in a narrow material sense. Heightened employee
satisfaction may lead to improved effort and less need to engage in
expensive monitoring.' 7  Moreover, employees are naturally
10. Steve Ferrey, The New Climate Metric: Sustainable Corporations and
Energy, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 388-90 (2011).
11. See, e.g., Marilyn Averill, Symposium, Introduction: Resilience, Law,
and Natural Resource Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 821, 826 (2009) (stating
that "sustainability" is a notoriously slippery term).
12. REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE, ch. 1, para. 49 (1987), available at
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm ("Sustainable development seeks to
meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability
to meet those of the future.").
13. See United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity, art. 3 (2002), available at
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf ("Cultural diversity ...
also means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral, and
spiritual existence.").
14. See JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS 69 (1997).
15. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 334 (2008).
16. Id. at 335.
17. Id. at 355; see also Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence
and Rule Following in Work Settings, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2005); TOM
R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000).
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knowledgeable about what is going on within a business and are
likely to have good ideas about how to improve.' 8 There are, it must
be said, a variety of countervailing costs. I have considered these
elsewhere.19 I believe the first bottom line, at least in large U.S.
corporations, is that employees frequently have a suboptimal level of
involvement in decision making even when looking only at
increasing economic productivity and output.2 0 This is an instance
of X-inefficiency at work.21
The second bottom line looks at how companies affect people.
Much evidence suggests that people feel better off if they are
involved in making important decisions that affect their lives. 22
Work is a major part of most adults' lives, and research suggests
that job satisfaction increases when employees are involved in
decision making.23 Skills and habits learned through participation
at work may also lead to greater participation in decisions in other
spheres of life, leading to further increases in satisfaction. 24
Of greatest importance to a discussion of sustainability, though,
is how employee involvement might change the external impacts of
corporations, particularly their impact on the environment-the
third bottom line.2 5 Since environmental laws do not go far enough
on their own to force businesses to internalize all the effects they
have on the environment, we want internal decision makers to take
into account-above and beyond any legal requirements-the
18. See McDonnell, supra note 15, at 355; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit
Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 133, 143
(1985); Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Shareholders Should Welcome
Knowledge Workers as Directors 6 (Institute for Empirical Research on
Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 283, 2005).
19. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 350-53; see also Kent Greenfield, The
Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 326 (1998).
20. Greenfield, supra note 19, at 286-87.
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
22. Peter Warr, Well-Being and the Workplace, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 392 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999);
B.D. Cawley, L.J. Keeping & P.E. Levy, Participation in the Performance
Appraisal Process and Employee Reactions: A Meta-Analytic Review of Field
Investigations, 83 J. APP. PSYCH. 615, 628 (1998); McDonnell, supra note 15, at
354; TYLER & BLADER, supra note 17, at 54-55.
23. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 354.
24. Melvin L. Kohn & Carmi Schooler, Stratification, Occupation, and
Orientation, in WORK AND PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION 5, 33 (1983); Melvin L. Kohn, Unresolved Issues in the
Relationship Between Work and Personality, in THE NATURE OF WORK:
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 36, 54 (Kai Erikson & Steven Peter Vallas eds.,
1990); Stephen C. Smith, Political Behavior as an Economic Externality, in
ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR-MANAGED
FIRMS: A RESEARCH MANUAL 123 (Derek C. Jones & Jan Svejnar eds., 1985);
McDonnell, supra note 15, at 369-70.
25. ELKINGTON, supra note 14, at 73.
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environmental effect of their company's actions. 26  My claim:
involving employees in corporate decision making will cause
companies to more fully internalize such environmental effects.
Are there any good reasons to believe that claim? I think there
are a few, although it remains an open empirical question with little
systematic evidence of which I am aware. 27 One reason goes back to
the first bottom line. Inefficient use of energy and other natural
resources may be widespread, and employees may have much useful
knowledge about that waste. For another, many2 8 environmental
externalities mainly affect communities near the place of work.
Compare the interest of employees with such local effects versus the
interests of shareholders in a public corporation, shareholders in a
closely held corporation, and top managers. Employees work in the
affected area and live nearby. They are thus likely to feel the effects
of environmental harm themselves and would like to avoid such
harm. Shareholders in a public corporation, on the other hand, do
not live nearby and are thus not as likely to feel the effects of
environmental harm.29 Shareholders in a closely held corporation
are more likely to be as locally rooted as their employees. However,
such shareholders have a greater personal economic stake in a
corporation's profit than employees do, making them care less about
goals other than profit maximization. Managers are as likely to
work and live locally as employees, hence they might be as prone to
consider environmental effects as employees if they are not
motivated to pursue shareholder interests, 30 although it is possible
that high level corporate managers are likely to be more physically
mobile in their careers than lower level employees, possibly
dissipating their interest in the welfare of the local community.
Employee involvement could also change the norms felt by
corporate decision makers. A telling critique of the shareholder
primacy model is that it induces shareholders and managers to
adopt a simple measure of maximizing shareholder wealth as the
sole criterion for judging corporate success.31 This is true even for
managers who in their personal lives may care a lot about the
environment: at work, they feel morally obliged to look after
shareholders and the bottom line first.32 In corporations that focus
26. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
27. See McDonnell, supra note 15, at 362-63 (discussing a few snippets of
evidence).
28. Though certainly not all-global warming is a key exception.
29. Shareholding in public corporations does have a local bias. See sources
cited in McDonnell, supra note 15, at 363 n.117 for examples. But even so,
public shareholders are quite unlikely to be as heavily locally concentrated as
their employees.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See McDonnell, supra note 15, at 361-62; LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 3 (2001).
32. McDonnell, supra note 15, at 361-62.
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significantly on responding to the ideas and preferences of their own
employees, those employees are less likely than shareholders or
managers to focus on a narrow norm of achieving a high stock price.
II. STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
There are many possible strategies for encouraging businesses
to take greater account of the interests of their employees. I group
these strategies into seven clusters, and briefly delineate and
discuss them here.
Laws other than business association law. One can try to
protect the interests of employees through other areas of the law.
General contract law, agency law, and especially employment law,
are widely used to protect employees. 33  This gives individual
employees a certain set of rights, either rights dictated for all
employees of a certain kind within a legal jurisdiction, or rights
negotiated between a company and its employees. If a company
violates one of these rights, employees may be able to sue in court to
protect their rights or seek remedies from an administrative
agency.34
Encourage officer or board power. American corporate laW35
focuses on three main groups: shareholders, directors, and officers.
Employees play little part. There is an ongoing power struggle
between shareholders and managers (directors and officers) over
what legal powers a public corporation's shareholders have and
what legal powers they should have.36  To encourage greater
attention to the interests of employees while operating within this
traditional focus of corporate governance, one must side with one or
two of these nonemployee groups and hope that one's preferred
group will tend to act in the interests of employees. Some scholars
favorable to the interests of employees have argued for siding with
corporate officers and directors over siding with shareholders,
hoping that inside managers (who are themselves a kind of
employee, after all) will choose to side with the employees with
whom they work instead of the more abstract and distant interests
of shareholders. 37
33. Labor law is of course another critical area of the law, but I deal with
unions as a separate strategy.
34. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006).
35. The situation is different in some other countries. In Germany, for
instance, employees play a major role through the law of codetermination.
Rebecca Page, Co-Determination in Germany-A Beginner's Guide, 33
ARBEITSPAPIER 11 (March 2006), available at http://www.boeckler.de/pdflp-arbp
033.pdf.
36. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA.
L. REV. 675, 676 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 601 (2006).
37. See MITCHELL, supra note 31, at 3; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).
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Encourage shareholder power. Perhaps employees share more
common interests with shareholders than managers. It may be that
both would be hurt by self-dealing if managers are left too
unaccountable. 3 8 Shareholder interests may be brought closer to the
interests of employees since most of the leading institutional
shareholder activists are union or public employee pension funds.39
Indeed, some have even termed the growing clout of such funds
"pension fund socialism." 40
Support unions. Historically, the leading way in which
employees have found a voice in a large number of companies was
through unions. Unions have been in decline for decades and have
become quite a small part of the private sector in the United
States.41 But millions of employees still belong to unions, and labor
law reform and revised unionization strategy could increase the rate
of unionization. Both legal reform and internal reform of unions
could also encourage unions to focus on more than just pay and
benefits, thus using unions to increase employee voice over a variety
of decisions.42
Promote means to give employees voice within corporations.
There are many ways to give employees more voice within
corporations. At the highest level, employees could elect some
directors. A step below that, Germany provides the example of work
councils at the plant level that give employees a voice on a variety of
issues.43 Employees could have nonbinding votes on particular
issues, or employee opinion on some matters could be surveyed.44
Employees could be given a voice on a variety of issues. Thus, one
can classify possible laws along three axes: the level within a
corporation at which employees have a voice, the scope of decisions
Going back to the original debate within corporate law scholarship over
managers versus shareholders, this was the position of Dodd. Merrick Dodd,
Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145, 1145
(1932).
38. See Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 731. In the ur-debate, this was the
position of Berle. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931).
39. William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 251 (1993).
40. Id.
41. U.S. unionization rates peaked at 28.3% in 1958, and had declined to
11.5% by 2003. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32553, UNION
MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004).
42. One existing law that discourages employee participation is found in
the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006). See McDonnell,
supra note 15, at 375 n.173 and accompanying text and sources cited there.
43. See Page, supra note 35, at 5.
44. Matthew T. Bodie, The Case for Employee Referenda on Transformative
Transactions as Shareholder Proposals, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 897, 897 (2010);
Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Lifting the Curse of the Sox Through Employee Assessments of
the Internal Control Environment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
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over which they have a voice, and the degree or kind of voice they
have over a particular matter.
Laws can be more or less aggressive in how they encourage any
of those measures. A law might require all corporations to provide a
particular measure. Or, a law might make a measure the default
rule but allow corporations to opt out-and the law may choose how
difficult opting out will be.45 The state can subsidize a preferred
measure with direct payments or tax preferences. 46 Or the law can
simply permit-without affirmatively encouraging-some forms of
employee voice. Assuming the law allows a given form of voice,
proponents need not focus attention on legal reform-they can
instead focus on attempting to persuade individual corporations to
adopt the measure, or forming new corporations that do.
When one considers both the large variety of possible forms of
employee voice within a corporation and the large number of ways to
encourage any particular form, this fifth category of strategy covers
a very large range of options.
Promote other legal forms of business association. Despite the
wide range of legal options just discussed, and the great flexibility of
U.S. corporate law, legal support for employee involvement in
corporate governance will always be a foreign graft within corporate
law. Corporate law is designed for shareholders to elect boards that
are responsible for running the company; accordingly, employees are
simply absent from the law's core DNA.
Employee advocates, thus, may want to pursue other legal
forms of business association. The worker cooperative is the most
obvious form.47 Flexible forms like the limited liability company
might be more easily adaptable than corporations to the goals of
employee advocates. Additionally, social responsibility advocates
are currently exploring a variety of new legal forms that reflect their
interests. 48
Promote changes in corporate culture and norms.49 One staple
of a certain strand of organizational behavior and management
45. Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate
Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 384 (2007).
46. Id. at 385.
47. David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New
Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
441, 441 (1983); JOHN PENCAVEL, WORKER PARTICIPATION: LESSONS FROM THE
WORKER CO-OPS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (2001); WILLIAM WHYTE &
KATHLEEN WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE
WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (2d ed. 1988).
48. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable Form of
Organtization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593-606 (2011); Linda 0. Smiddy,
Symposium, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C and Other Developments in
Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 3 (2010).
49. I thank Matt Bodie for suggesting this as an additional possible
strategy.
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improvement literature is that the corporate culture should promote
employee engagement.50 This strategy does not require any sort of
legal change. Rather, it seeks to promote change company-by-
company through affecting the norms of managerial behavior.51 The
management literature frequently makes the point that a corporate
culture in which employees feel engaged offers many benefits to a
corporation. 52 However, there is at least some reason to be skeptical
that this literature is just a "fad for the millennium."53
This list of seven categories of strategies addressing the
interests of employees is not exhaustive, and each category is itself
broad and contains a range of options. Still, I hope it provides some
useful organization in thinking through the best strategies.
III. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING AMONG STRATEGIES
Before evaluating the attractiveness of these strategies, we
must first consider what criteria to use in making those evaluations.
Considering a wide range of factors makes comparisons more
ambiguous, as inevitably some strategies will appear superior
according to some criteria but inferior according to others.
Nonetheless, all the criteria considered matter and it won't do to
simply ignore them for simplicity's sake.
We must think about the strategy's probability of success and
also how much good it would accomplish if successful. The latter
can be divided into several factors-the triple bottom line.5 4 We
care about the net economic surplus (somewhat narrowly conceived
in money terms) generated within companies, and also about the
well-being (more broadly conceived) of employees themselves.
Beyond this, we care about the externalities that companies
generate, and in particular about their effects on the environment.
Aggregating these different predicted effects is, of course, hard-and
there is no objective, neutral, and authoritative way to do so.
Probability of a strategy's success can also be divided into
uncertainty concerning the chances the strategy will actually
succeed in creating the intended employee involvement, and
uncertainty about the effect that involvement would have if it were
achieved. For instance, consider a law intended to increase
50. RICKY W. GRIFFIN & GREGORY MOORHEAD, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR:
MANAGING PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS ch. 5 (9th ed. 2010); Steven H.
Applebaum, Danielle Hebert & Sylvie Leroux, Empowerment: Power, Culture,
and Leadership-A Strategy or Fad for the Millennium?, 11 J. WORKPLACE
LEARNING 233 (1999); Darrol J. Stanley, The Impact of Empowered Employees
on Corporate Value, 8 GRAzIADIO Bus. REV. (2005), available at
http://gbr.pepperdine.edul2010/08/empowered-employees/.
51. See Stanley, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. Applebaum, Hebert & Leroux, supra note 50.
54. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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unionization. There is uncertainty about how much of an increase
in unionization any given law would achieve.55 There is also
uncertainty as to how increased unionization, if it were (somewhat
miraculously) achieved, would affect company output, employee
satisfaction, and the environment.
Political feasibility is a crucial consideration in evaluating the
probability of success. One aim is to find strategies that are self-
perpetuating and generative-not only can one see a path for initial
political success, but also such success can create support for future,
more ambitious initiatives. One should, however, be careful about
using political infeasibility to weed out a strategy too quickly. What
seems hard to imagine now may become imaginable in the future;
indeed, academic exercises can sometimes crucially shape future
ideas about what is possible and attractive. As Keynes said:
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in
the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of
vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the
gradual encroachment of ideas.56
A final element to consider in evaluating strategies is short-run
versus long-run effects and probabilities. Some strategies
(especially the first three in our list) are likely to pay off more
quickly than others. Other things being equal, these strategies are
favored. But presumably in a discussion of how to promote
sustainability we should apply a low-discount rate and not overly
handicap strategies likely to pay off only in the longer run, since
creating businesses and an economy that are functional for the long
haul is, after all, the defining focus of our task.
IV. CHOOSING AMONG STRATEGIES
Finally, I apply the criteria of Part IV to choosing among the
strategies listed in Part III. My choices will be rough and utterly
debatable. But I hope that even those who disagree with the
preferences expressed will find the framework helpful in thinking
through the question of how to best go about increasing employee
involvement in corporate governance as a way of creating more
sustainable companies. I consider each strategy in turn and
conclude with an overall comparison.
Laws other than business association law. Probability of success
55. Perhaps, alas, there is less uncertainty than one would like-the
chances of greatly increasing the degree of unionization in the United States
seems quite bleak.
56. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383 (1936).
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depends upon what types of legal change one contemplates.
Employers will fight changes that impose significant constraints on
their ability to treat employees as they choose. But modest changes
in this area are probably one of the most politically viable among the
strategies under consideration. Employment law has seen a great
deal of change in recent decades, in both legislation and in courts,
which suggests that this is an area in which movement is possible.57
However, the potential gains from changes here may be quite
limited. There are presumably a variety of reforms available that
could improve employee welfare.5 8 There are many fewer reforms
that could do so while simultaneously improving net output as well
(always a problem-after all, if such easy changes were out there,
why wouldn't companies already be acting accordingly?). But for
our purposes here the biggest problem with strategies that focus on
changing judicially or administratively enforceable individual rights
is that they don't increase collective employee involvement in
decision making. Instead, they focus on employees as individuals
with rights, not as a group that could help influence company
behavior.59 Thus, these laws do not help us use employees to
directly improve the way businesses affect the environment and
other external constituencies. The strategy nonetheless remains
valuable insofar as it can improve the lot of employees without
sacrificing (too much) in economic productivity, but it is of less
interest for a conversation focused on sustainability.
Encourage officer or board power. The next two strategies do
not aim to increase employee involvement directly, but rather they
help employees by promoting another group in corporate
governance. The big advantage of both of these strategies is that
they have quite a good chance of political success. The ongoing
struggle between boards and shareholders is close and heavily
fought-and both sides could win many battles. Deciding to throw
the weight of persons and organizations that favor employees to one
side or the other could very well tip the balance of power.
Which side should employee advocates favor? Shareholder
power may lead to short-termism or cost-cutting measures that may
hurt employees.60 Directors and officers that are not subject to
excessive pressure from shareholders may better balance the
interests of all corporate constituencies, including the employees,
57. For an overview, see STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE
HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES: BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
INTO Focus (2009).
58. Id. at 3.
59. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010).
60. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Labor and Management in a More
Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2007).
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the environment, and the broader community.6 1 But note that
directors and officers may often side with employees, but not with
the environment or community. After all, keeping employees happy
and productive can more readily be reconciled with the interests of a
company and its shareholders than protecting the environment
above and beyond what the law requires. If one believes that
employees will tend to favor community interests, 62 then that is a
real disadvantage of pursuing employee interests indirectly rather
than by directly increasing employee involvement. Moreover, siding
with managers does little to increase the political power of
employees, and hence does little to expand the long-run picture of
what is feasible.
Encourage shareholder power. Employee advocates could
instead side with shareholders. Doing so may both constrain self-
dealing within particular corporations and reduce the power of the
managerial class within society and politics as a whole. Employees
themselves are also increasingly important as shareholders, both
through pension plans and through 401(k)s and similar holdings. In
choosing between this and the previous pro-management strategy,
note that unions themselves (or at least the pension funds that they
manage) have chosen shareholders over managers as their allies,
with union funds playing a leading role in contemporary
shareholder activism. 63 Of course, from the perspective of those who
put shareholder interests first, this union role in shareholder
activism is problematic, 64 but it is a good thing from our perspective.
But again, as with the previous strategy, it may be that the
persons put in power by shareholder activism, with the help of
unions, may tend to favor employee interests but not environmental
or other community interests. This strategy does not give employees
themselves more power, but only more power to another group
(shareholders) that may side with employees on some issues but not
others. Again too, this strategy does little to directly empower
employees politically, and hence does little to expand the long-run
set of possibilities available.
Support unions. This strategy has the great advantage of
having achieved real success in the past. Unions were instrumental
in helping to improve wages and working conditions and giving
employees some degree of voice within many companies65 (although
the matters subject to collective bargaining have been more limited
61. See Blair & Stout, supra note 37, at 315 (discussing the board as a
mediating hierarch).
62. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63. See Simon, supra note 39; Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas,
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019 (1998).
64. See Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 610.
65. RICHARD B. FREEMAN, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 3-4 (1984).
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than a sustainable corporation advocate would probably want to
see). It is disputed to what extent, if any, this came at the expense
of economic productivity.66 Just as importantly, when unions were
powerful, they had great political power, and that power made many
other kinds of progressive reforms and policies more achievable.67
Unions are not always natural advocates of the kind of policies that
those concerned with sustainability prefer-strong environmental
laws, for instance, may create concerns about lost jobs. Still,
increased unionization would generally help put more progressive
politicians in power, which on the whole would increase the range of
politically feasible options for improving sustainability. And unions
may even sometimes support environmental regulation itself.68
The greatest defect of this strategy is also political.
Unionization levels have decreased for so long that it does not seem
likely that the United States will ever return even close to the levels
seen in the first few decades after World War II. The weakness of
unions is self-reinforcing, as companies successfully fight legal
changes to make union organizing easier.69 Moreover, unionization
is harder than it once was because of the changing nature of
employment, including both the move from factories to service
industries and the increasingly weak ties between employees and
their companies. 70
Promote means to give employees voice within corporations.
This strategy includes many variations, and thus it is hard to apply
our criteria. But this strategy is unlikely to have large payoffs in
the short run. The versions of this strategy that involve large legal
changes that would strongly encourage or mandate significant
employee involvement are politically quite unlikely to succeed,7'
while versions that involve smaller legal changes or a focus on
organizing within particular existing or new firms may face less
resistance, but will also bring about less widespread change in the
short run.
On the other hand, the longer-run prospects for this strategy
are more promising. More modest legal changes in the short run
may set the stage for bigger changes in the long run. Experiments
at individual companies may highlight successful approaches that
66. Id. at 162-63.
67. Id. at 191-92. Interestingly, unions seem to have been more effective at
helping pass general social legislation than legislation narrowly aimed at
promoting their own power.
68. Bruce Yandle, Unions and Environmental Regulation, 6 J. LAB. RES.
429, 435 (1985).
69. John Logan, The Union Avoidance Industry in the United States, 44:4
BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 651, 651 (2006).
70. See generally DANIEL H. PINK, FREE AGENT NATION (2002) (discussing
the changing nature of the American workforce).
71. Mandatory codetermination at the federal level, anyone?
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eventually spread widely. 72 A series of small-scale successes over
time may help build political support for bigger and bolder
experiments.
Promote other legal forms of business association. This strategy
also appears more promising for the long run. States are unlikely to
adopt drastically new statutes en masse, and even if they did, there
are enough obstacles to highly innovative organizational forms that
such a form will not be quickly adopted. One might point to LLCs as
a contrary example. 73  But LLCs drew heavily upon existing
experience with corporations and forms of partnerships and were
not as radical as, say, worker co-ops. 7 4 The LLC suggests that
organizational change through new forms of business association is
a promising strategy, but it is most likely to succeed if it is
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Rather than leaping
immediately to widespread adoption of a form that gives employees
strong elements of control, we are more likely to succeed with a
procession of innovations that gradually and incrementally extend
employee involvement.
Promote changes in corporate culture and norms. Changes in
corporate cultures and norms can be accomplished without legal
change. Changes can occur incrementally and can build upon
themselves. Norm entrepreneurs can champion new norms, and if
they are lucky they can create bandwagon effects leading to
cascading change. 75  The business school and management
literature on empowering employees may represent such a norm
cascade.76 But I wouldn't hold my breath just yet as that literature
is notoriously subject to fads, and employees should often be rightly
skeptical of managers who come bearing gifts of alleged
empowerment.
Choosing among the strategies. Having briefly applied our
criteria to each of the seven strategies, which looks most promising?
The answer depends on whether one focuses on short run or long
run prospects.
In the short run, the first three strategies and perhaps the last
look most promising. Reforming laws (other than business
association law) and encouraging board or shareholder power each
offer some realistic chance of producing relatively immediate
72. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
73. See generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1
(2010) (discussing the rise of LLCs).
74. See Rory Ridley-Duff, Cooperative Social Enterprises: Company Rules,
Access to Finance and Management Practice, 5 Soc. ENTER. J. 50 (2009).
75. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 909 (1996); see also ERIc A. POSNER, LAw AND SOcIAL NORMS 30 (2000);
Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 1, 1
(2001). For some welcome skepticism, see David E. Pozen, We Are All
Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 284 (2008).
76. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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successes. Unfortunately, the payoffs to increased sustainability
from these three strategies look suspect. Some improved employee
rights through changes in employment law may increase employee
well-being while not hurting productivity. However, while employee
well-being and productivity are indeed a component of sustainability
broadly understood, insofar as we seek ways to directly improve the
impact companies have on communities and the environment,
stronger employee rights are unlikely to have much effect. While
such rights protect employees individually, they do little to increase
employee involvement in core decision making.77
The second and third strategies have a somewhat similar
problem. In the ongoing battle between shareholders and boards,
the fight is close enough that either side has a realistic chance at
success, so whichever side employee advocates take, they have a real
shot at short-run victory. It is unclear which side is better for
employees-I ultimately incline towards shareholders, largely
because that is the side unions have taken.78 A caution on that
argument, though, is that unions acting as fiduciaries in investing to
meet pension obligations may have different interests than unions
acting to pursue the interests of their members within the
workplace.79 And even if that is the better side for employees, it is
not necessarily the better side for communities and the
environment. Because these two strategies do not directly give
decision making power to employees, these strategies do not bring
employees' perspective to bear in pushing companies in a more
sustainable direction. Indeed, I rather suspect that, on the whole,
community and environmental interests are less endangered in
companies that feature board primacy instead of shareholder
primacy.80 For employees, the increased accountability that comes
with shareholder primacy is on balance probably a gain, but for the
community and environment, internal accountability is less
important than the costs associated with the short-term bottom line
focus that also follows from shareholder primacy.
Our final strategy, promoting norm changes, also has some
chance at short run success, although only modestly so. This
strategy works manager-by-manager, corporation-by-corporation,
and so modest gains are possible without major changes in the law.
There is even the possibility of a rapid large-scale norm cascade.8' I
77. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
78. Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations,
and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L. J. 205, 250 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell,
Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access (Minnesota Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 10-03) [hereinafter "Shareholder Bylaws"], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537211.
79. Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 77.
80. MITCHELL, supra note 31, at 3.
81. See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 912.
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confess to skepticism that management literature happy talk is
likely to lead to real widespread substantive change. However, if
that skepticism is misplaced, this strategy could be the only one
with serious promise in both the short and the long run.
For bigger payoffs in sustainability, we must turn to the next
three or four strategies, most of which will only succeed, if ever, in
the longer run. Among these, I would like to believe that large
increases in unionization are possible, but I strongly suspect that
the time for unions has come and gone. That leaves us with a
variety of experiments, legal and nonlegal, exploring greater
employee involvement within both the corporate form and other
forms of business association. Some of these experiments will
involve legal changes, most on a state-by-state basis. Other
experiments will work within existing laws and explore greater
employee involvement company by company. This local, case-by-
case experimentalism is both a blessing and a curse. It will take a
long time and may never result in massive change that affects all or
most businesses. But, the experimentalism will help us figure out
what works, and what doesn't work, at relatively low cost, and the
localism and gradualism give a way to start small and build
strength over time rather than having to immediately fight powerful
entrenched interests that are opposed to large scale change.
Truth be told, none of the strategies look all that rosy. The ones
that have the greatest hope of tangible results in the short run do
not directly strengthen employee involvement in corporate
governance, their effects on employee well-being are uncertain, and
their effect on sustainability beyond employee well-being look small
and sometimes negative. The strategies that have potential for a
bigger payoff in both employee well-being and sustainability as to
community and environmental effects are quite unlikely to yield
much gain in the short run, and even their long run prospects are
highly uncertain. Clearly, sustainability advocates should be
looking at other options besides employee involvement. And yet,
increased sustainability is a goal for the long run, and one that
ultimately must involve many struggles along many different fronts.
Some of the strategies for increasing employee involvement in
corporate governance may prove to be among the struggles worth
pursuing.
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